We fully characterize best-response functions in Colonel Blotto games with lottery contest success functions.
Introduction
Friedman [2] derives the unique equilibrium of a two-player Colonel Blotto game with a lottery success function [4] in each battlefield. He also offers a characterization of a player's best-response function in the game. However, for some values of the primitives, his proposed characterization results in infeasible negative allocations to battlefields.
This article completely characterizes a player's best response function in the game, thereby correcting Friedman. This facilitates the analysis of Stackelberg models of attack and defense, where a complete account of subgame behavior is required for equilibrium analysis. It also aids in behavioral analyses of Blotto games, where systematic deviations from optimal behavior are analyzed. 
Model
Suppose two players, i = 1, 2, are endowed with budgets, X i ∈ R ++ . The two players simultaneously divide their respective budgets into (sunk) allocations across n ≥ 2 independent battlefields. The finite set of battlefields is denoted by B and player i's value of winning battlefield j ∈ B is v ij ∈ R ++ . Any allocation to battlefield j by player i needs to be non-negative, x ij ∈ R + . Player i's pure strategy space is the set of non-negative n-tuples
Each player's objective function is given by Π i = ∑ n j=1 p ij v ij where p ij is the probability of player i winning battlefield j, determined by a lottery contest success function:
The Maximization Problem and Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
Suppose player −i selects an allocation x −i ≫ 0. In this case, p ij and Π i are continuous in x ij ∀j. 2 Then, the constrained optimization problem faced 2 There are two other cases. One alternative case involves x −ij such that x −ij > 0 ∀j ∈
For j ∈ B \ C −i , p ij (and the associated p ij v ij ) is discontinuous at x ij = 0, taking the value 1 2 at x ij = 0 and 1 for all x ij > 0. Because p ij v ij is strictly increasing in x ij for j ∈ C −i and there is no smallest x ij strictly greater than 0 for j ∈ B \ C −i , there is no best response to
The final case involves x −i such that x −ij = 0 ∀j. In this case, any feasible allocation
2 by player i can be expressed as
The corresponding Lagrangian is
Taking the derivative with respect to x ij and equating it to 0,
In addition, we have n + 1 dual feasibility conditions (see expression (2)) and n + 1 complementary slackness conditions (see expressions (3) and (4)):
Best-Response Functions
Without loss of generality, we assume that battlefields are ordered such that
Define
Note that the bracketed inequality holds if and only if
Note first that (5) implies that the left hand side (LHS) of condition (7) is non-increasing in j and strictly decreasing from j to j + 1 if and only if
. Moreover, the right hand side (RHS) is non-decreasing in j and is strictly increasing from j to j + 1 if and only if
.
One consequence is that if Clearly, for j = 1, the inequality in condition (6) reduces to
2 , which clearly holds because for
. As a consequence, there is a unique set K = {1, ..., k * } such that ∀j ∈ {1, ..., k * } the inequality in condition (6) holds and ∀j > k * the inequality does not hold.
We now claim. follows:
Proposition 1 (Best Response Function). For given primitives (X
where
Note that the corresponding expression for x ib when b ∈ K will be strictly positive if
Since (9) To verify the claim for the first case, note that, for a positive allocation, the complementary slackness condition (4) requires µ p = 0 ∀p ∈ K. Therefore, condition (1) for battlefields p ∈ K is reduced to:
Note that µ 0 > 0 and µ p = 0 satisfy the dual feasibility conditions (2).
Rearranging and taking the square root,
Summing both sides over the elements j ∈ K,
Given that µ 0 > 0, the complementary slackness condition (3) implies X i − ∑ n j=1 x ij = 0. Because (8) implies that x ip > 0 if and only if p ∈ K, it follows that ∑ j∈K x ij = X i . Therefore,
Solving for µ 0 ,
Substituting from (10) for µ 0 in (11) and rearranging,
Thus, we have confirmed that the necessary and sufficient conditions hold for the specification of x ib , b ∈ K, in Proposition 1. To verify the claim for
Substituting the RHS of expression (11) for µ 0 in expression (13) and solving for µ z ,
The dual feasibility condition (2) µ z ≥ 0 holds for z ∈ B \ K if and only if the RHS of the expression above is non-negative.
Rearranging,
Note that the remaining complementary slackness condition (4) is trivially satisfied. Condition (14) and the condition defining elements of K in (6) are mutually exclusive and exhaust all possible cases. Thus, our proposed characterization of x ib is the unique solution.
Revisiting Friedman's Best-Response Function
In a version where v ij = v −ij , Friedman [2] provides the following characterization for the best response function (see equation (12) of [2] ). Given the primitives of the example and x 2 = (10, 40), it can be easily verified that, according to Proposition 1, the optimal allocations to battlefields 1 ∈ K and 2 / ∈ K are x 11 = X 1 = 5 and x 12 = 0, respectively.
